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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Kenya adopted a new constitution in August 2010. This marked a key turning point in the 
country’s political life. Kenya had failed to produce a new constitution in spite of efforts 
over a long period to develop one. Political divisions deepened in the process, 
culminating in the post-2007 election violence. The post-election violence exposed deep-
seated weaknesses in Kenya’s political system and institutions of the state generally. The 
violence ended after the two parties to the dispute, the Government/Party of National 
Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), signed the Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement (referred to here as the National 
Accord), under the mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, led by Mr Kofi Annan.  
2. The dialogue and reconciliation process identified constitutional and institutional 
reforms as critical for the achievement of sustainable peace and stability. The new 
constitution is, thus, an important achievement of the KNDR process. It marks a fresh 
start for Kenya.  
3. This review report covers the period between April and June 2011. It examines the 
progress in implementing reforms during this transition period. It has focussed on the 
key themes under the KNDR agreement. Previous reports are found at 
www.dialoguekenya.org  
Findings 
4. Data collected between 2008 and2010 period reveal that the social-political and 
economic situation did improve after the signing of the National Accord and got better. 
By the end of 2010, many people stated that life was better compared to 2008 and they 
felt safer. By June 2011, however, people cite the rising cost of living and inflation in 
general as the main challenges facing the country. Only half of the respondents feel safer. 
Many people feel life is getting worse as compared to one year ago. The difficult socio-
economic situation requires to be addressed urgently because its negative social 
consequences could exacerbate political difficulties and destabilise the framework for 
reforms and the society in general. 
The ICC and the fight against impunity  
5. The ICC intervention in the Kenya situation has increasingly become a driver of the 
politics around the 2012 elections. It is seeking to re-establish accountability in Kenya’s 
political culture and is, therefore, causing anxiety among political elites. It has 
occasioned the formation and fragmentation of ethnic coalitions. Nonetheless, many 
Kenyans still believe that prosecution of perpetrators of violence will prevent a 
recurrence of violence. They are disillusioned by the lack of progress in arresting lower 
and middle level perpetrators and holding senior and influential people to account.  
6. Politicians are widely viewed as sponsors of illegal armed groups that took part in the 
violence, and which transformed into extortion gangs. Up to 42 per cent of respondents 
in the survey think these illegal groups will emerge and play a political role before 2012. 
Failure to prosecute political and civil crimes has eroded public confidence in the 
government’s ability and willingness to fight impunity. It has slowed the momentum of 
citizen advocacy for prosecution or other forms of accountability.   
7. National baseline survey data show that more than 50 per cent of respondents are 
optimistic that there will be no violence in 2012. Nonetheless, lethargy in the fight 
against impunity for political violence is causing public disillusionment. Deterrence 
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measures promised under the framework of the National Accord have not been effected. 
Given past experience with violence during election years, failure to take concrete steps 
to break the cycle of impunity is increasing public anxiety as the 2012 elections approach.  
The challenge of resettling IDPs 
8. The government has made efforts to find durable solutions to IDPs: food, shelter, 
counselling, money, land and peace efforts. However, IDPs are still in camps. The 
challenges that have encumbered the resettlement programme stem from failure to carry 
out a comprehensive registration and profiling of IDPs from the onset. Such a profiling 
exercise would have identified the different categories of IDPs and appropriate solutions 
for each. 
9. Allocating land to landless IDPs has attracted land-hungry persons into camps seeking to 
benefit from the exercise. Efforts to allocate land have also triggered local discourses of 
favouritism and exclusion, as well as local rejection of IDPs. This suggests that local level 
grievances, particularly around land, are yet to be resolved. It is important to emphasise 
that the presence of IDPs in camps, three years after the signing of the National Accord, 
indicates that communities have not fully reconciled and that reforms have been 
insufficient in this regard. As the next General Election approaches, greater effort needs 
to be put into establishing the identity and origin of those in camps and why they are 
unable to return, in order to provide appropriate durable solutions. 
Implementation of the new constitution   
10. The promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010 marked a new beginning in 
Kenya. The country has had a tortuous and protracted two-decade struggle for 
comprehensive constitutional reforms. A new constitution is an important milestone in 
Kenya’s history. It clearly marks a new beginning and a transition from the older order to 
the new one. There is progress in making some of the laws prioritised under Schedule 
Five. However, there are many laws to be finalised by 27 August 2011, the deadline 
imposed by the constitution. Parliament will have to speed up the legislative process to 
meet this deadline. Divisions in Parliament along party and other cleavages, however, 
will have to be resolved for Parliament to effectively meet this challenge. 
11. A conservative political culture and the old order threaten implementation of the new 
constitution. Lack of bi-partisan leadership, internal conflicts in the coalition and in 
Parliament are slowing the pace of implementing the constitution. Further, civic 
education providers have not been active yet awareness on the new constitution is critical 
for building citizens knowledge to create demand for reforms. However, the public is 
supportive of the new achievements, such as the public participation in the appointment 
of key state officers. 
12. The constitution is one major achievement thus far. It is opening a new window for 
reforms and offering a fresh start. It has set new standards in the appointment of public 
officers. But there has been limited progress in some areas such as reforming the police, 
national cohesion and reconciliation, and the fight against impunity in general. As the 
country approaches the next elections, there is need to fast-track police reforms and 
enactment of electoral laws in order to make adequate preparations for a clean and 
peaceful poll. 
Long-term issues and solutions  
13. Another General Election is fast approaching when progress in institutional reforms such 
as the police has been slow. Communities have not fully reconciled and IDPs are in 
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camps. Nonetheless, the new constitution also spells out the reform measures to be 
undertaken to improve the police. Change of attitude and behaviour, and adherence to 
modern democratic norms is an imperative for the police as the country moves towards 
another election. Thus, vetting of the police must be opened to the public in line with the 
new standards. This will improve public confidence in the police and begin creating a 
culture of transparency.  
14. There is progress in reforming the Judiciary. The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief 
Justice are in office through a process that had public participation at its core. Nominees 
for other Judges of the Supreme Court were also recruited through a transparent process; 
a new standard entrenched by the constitution. There is also increased vigilance in the 
recruitment process. Public litigation efforts have increased in this respect.  
Conclusion 
15. The report has emphasised that the Agenda 4 reforms under the KNDR agreement were 
aimed at securing sustainable peace by addressing all the fault lines from which the post-
election violence evolved. The discussion has also noted that the new constitution firmly 
anchors all the Agenda 4 reforms. The spirit of constitutionalism – based on values and 
principles espoused by the new constitution – is required to move the country forward. 
The new constitution is not an end in it itself; it is a means for achieving the goal of 
‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya’.  
16. Not all the fault-lines around which post-2007 elections occurred have been bridged. 
Political competition is still organised around ethnic coalitions and alliances. The high 
cost of living is fuelling new grievances, which could converge with other political 
dynamics to destabilise the framework for reforms as the country moves towards another 
election. Critical institutions, laws and processes for the next elections should be put in 
place early enough to enable adequate preparations. There is need to fast-track police 
reforms and enact electoral laws to ensure a clean and peaceful election. Importantly, the 
date for the next General Election must be clarified as soon as possible in order to 
prepare everyone and to put in place in good time the requisite institutional and 
logistical measures. 
1.  INTRODUCTION    
 
17. On 27 August 2010, Kenya turned a new page by promulgating its constitution. This is an 
important development in the country’s political history. Kenya had failed to produce a 
new constitution in spite of efforts over a long period to develop one. This failure to 
undertake comprehensive reforms deepened socio-political divisions, which found 
expression in the violence that followed the dispute over the 2007 presidential election. 
The violence exposed structural weaknesses in Kenya’s political system and institutions 
of the state. The violence ended after the two parties to the dispute, the 
Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM), signed the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement, 
through the mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, led by Mr Kofi Annan.  
18. The parties committed to undertake far reaching reforms to prevent a recurrence of 
violence. They committed to the goal of ‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in 
Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human rights’. They committed to tackle 
four main issues expressed as Agenda Items 1-4.2  
19. The dialogue and reconciliation process identified, under Agenda Item 4, constitutional 
and institutional transformation crucial to sustainable peace and stability and as a 
foundation for comprehensive reforms. The new constitution is thus an important 
achievement of the KNDR process. It marks a fresh start for Kenya because it  is a 
transition from the older order to a new one. 
20. This review report examines the progress in implementing reforms during this transition 
period. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements 
from 2008. Previous reports can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org. 
21. The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data was 
collected through a national survey of 2,500 respondents drawn from across all the 
regions of the country. It also draws on data collected in earlier surveys. Qualitative data 
was obtained through interviews with key informants drawn from Government 
ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media and the 
public at large. Secondary information was obtained by reviewing reports and documents 
by the Government, development agencies, the media and non-governmental bodies. 
22. The review recognises too well that tracking progress of implementation of reforms is 
bound to excite interest in various quarters. In writing the report, therefore, we have 
taken care to remain objective and to let the data speak. 
23. The report adopts a thematic approach, reflecting key reform issues in the constitution 
implementation process.  The report is organised as follows: 
a. Part II: The Socio-Political Situation and the Challenge of Impunity 
b. Part III: The Challenge of Resettling IDPs 
c. Part IV: The Status of the Coalition Government 
d. Part V: Challenges to the New Constitution  
e. Part VI: Conclusion 
                                                
2 Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties; Agenda Item 2: 
Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis and promote healing and reconciliation; Agenda Item 3: 
How to overcome the political crisis; and Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional 
and institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities, youth unemployment, national cohesion, and 
transparency and accountability. 
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2. THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
IMPUNITY 
Introduction 
24. The KNDR agreement recognised that fighting impunity was essential if the country was 
to address the root causes of violence. The mediation team noted that ‘the fight against 
impunity must underpin the entire reform agenda.’ Consequently, the Grand Coalition 
Government established the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence 
(chaired by Justice Philip Waki)3 to investigate the facts and circumstances related to the 
post-election violence and to make recommendations on measures that should be taken 
to prevent its recurrence. 4 
 
25. At the end of its mandate, CIPEV observed that ‘impunity lies at the heart of preventing 
the kind of violence that has been witnessed in this country time and time again. The 
eradication of impunity will, therefore, not only blow off the cover for persons who break 
the law but also deter others who may contemplate similar deeds in future.’5 CIPEV 
recommended setting up a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try those 
responsible for the most serious criminal acts during the crisis period. It further 
recommended that an envelope containing the names of suspected perpetrators be 
handed to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the government failed to set up a 
Special Tribunal. 
 
26. This review report comprises a summary of major issues that have arisen in the fight 
against impunity thus far. It also documents public perceptions of the ICC and its 
contribution to this endeavour. 
The social economic context 
27. By the end of 2010 and in the first quarter of 2011, survey findings showed the socio-
political and economic situation in Kenya had considerably improved compared to the 
period just after the post-election violence in early 2008. Although incidents of violence 
and crime were reported in some areas of the country, they did not result from political 
disputes. From the surveys, many people felt safer than they did in early 2008.  
28. By the end of June 2011, only half of the respondents (50%) reported that they felt safer, 
almost the equivalent of people who reported feeling safer in August 2009, one-and-a-
half years after the post-election violence. Public anxieties over the outcome of the ICC 
intervention, the cultivation of ethno-political alliances, shifting ethnic coalitions, and 
intensified competition for the 2012 General Election are causing concern because it is 
not certain how the future will evolve. Moreover, these are the main fault lines that might 
converge to cause conflict.  
 
                                                
3 So named after Justice Philip Waki, who chaired the Commission 
4 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 2008) 
5 Ibid, p. 444 
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Figure 1:  Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 General Election, 
do you feel safe, less safe or about the same? 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Safer
Less safe
About the same
NR
50%
35%
14%
1%
Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 general 
election, do you feel safe, less safe or about the same? (by total)
 
29. The high cost of living is the most serious problem facing Kenya today. Up to 68 per cent 
of respondents feel that the high cost of living is the most serious problem, while 15 per 
cent and 7 per cent think unemployment and corruption, respectively, are the main 
challenges facing the country. People are also concerned about poor leadership. These 
are certainly important challenges that must be confronted as the country moves towards 
another General Election. 
Table 1: What is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? 
In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? 
  High cost of living 68% 
 Lack of employment/ Jobs 15% 
 Tribalism 2% 
 Corruption 7% 
 Poor leadership 5% 
 Insecurity 1% 
 Infrastructure 1% 
30. Unemployment remains a significant problem in all parts of Kenya: up to 78 per cent of 
respondents in the survey said availability of jobs had become worse than it was one year 
before. High commodity prices in a context of unemployment, and increased food 
insecurity particularly in poor urban households, contribute to public anxiety. Combined 
with uncertainties resulting from limited progress in addressing the long-standing issues 
4  
  
that cause violence, these dynamics can converge to create political difficulties for the 
country.  
Table 2: How would you compare life today and one year ago regarding the following? 
  Much 
worse 
Somewhat 
worse 
About the 
same 
Somewhat 
better 
Much 
better 
DK/NR 
Availability of jobs 55% 23% 10% 8% 2% 1% 
Ability to buy food 75% 18% 3% 2% 0% 1% 
Ability to get medical care 31% 21% 20% 22% 4% 1% 
Ability to pay for education 37% 21% 18% 17% 5% 2% 
Cost of living in general 81% 12% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
31. Concern over the high cost of living is reflected in the proportion of the population that is 
able to access basic needs without difficulty: 93 per cent of respondents said their ability 
to buy food had taken a turn for the worse over the past year. The data shows that only 
about one quarter of respondents were happy with service delivery in the education and 
health sectors, where 23 per cent and 26 per cent respectively said their ability to pay for 
these services had improved.  
32. The data presented here show that the social-economic situation in the country had 
considerably improved but that it is now beginning to decline. The escalating food prices 
and rising inflation are issues that require urgent measures because their social 
consequences could converge with other dynamics to prevent the undertaking of critical 
reforms to support a peaceful and clean election.  
Political Will to Fight Impunity: The Gap 
33. Lack of political will to fight impunity. After the signing of the National Accord and 
formation of the Grand Coalition Government, there arose a debate on how to address 
the post-election violence. Between March and April 2008, there was a debate on 
whether to prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence or to grant them amnesty. 
The ‘amnesty debate’ was the first point of dissonance in the Grand Coalition 
Government on the matter of impunity. In general, PNU favoured prosecution of 
suspects while ODM favoured amnesty. This issue continued to divide the coalition and 
prevented the development of a common position on how to deliver accountability for 
the post-election violence. The parties did not reconcile their positions or develop a 
common approach on how to close the chapter on Kenya’s post-2007 election violence. 
This failure to take a decisive position on post-election violence has transformed this 
conflict into a major fulcrum around which politics and other events are revolving.  
34. PEV cases are poorly prosecuted or lack adequate evidence. The lack of commitment to 
a common position on PEV has resulted in failure to hold suspected perpetrators of the 
violence accountable. Of the 92 low-level suspects arrested in 2008, 19 were charged in 
May 2009 in Eldoret. They were later acquitted for lack of evidence.  The court argued 
that the police had failed to establish a prima facie case against the accused, which would 
require them to be put on trial. Similarly, in November 2009, a Nakuru court acquitted 
three suspects for lack of evidence. These cases generally point to poor investigative and 
prosecutorial capacity on matters around the post-election violence. 
35. Scepticism over the fight against impunity has increased: The failure to hold post-
election violence perpetrators to account has increased public scepticism on commitment 
to fight impunity for ordinary crime. For instance, some extortion gangs operate in urban 
areas because low-level perpetrators were not arrested or made to account for their role 
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in the post-election violence. Over half (54%) of those interviewed agree that police 
officers know members of illegally armed groups but do not take any action against them.  
Table 3: Thinking of illegal armed groups, do you agree or disagree with these statements? 
 
 Agree Disagree Don't 
know 
NR 
Illegal armed groups will re-emerge during the 2012 general 
election 
42% 35% 22% 1% 
Politicians finance illegal armed groups 
64% 
 
19% 16% 1% 
There are no illegal armed groups in this area 48% 39% 
12% 
 
1% 
The police know members of illegal groups 54% 22% 
23% 
 
1% 
The illegal armed groups provide security to the local 
people 
22% 61% 16% 2% 
36. Illegal groups could become part of competitive politics: Previous reports have 
mentioned that illegal armed groups are associated with politicians. Interviews also 
revealed that senior politicians depend on these groups to fight off opponents. During the 
period under review, many of those surveyed (64%) agreed that politicians finance illegal 
armed groups. Yet, 42 per cent were convinced that these groups will re-emerge during 
the 2012 General Election. This is a significant finding: it appears that illegal armed 
groups are gradually becoming part of the culture of elections in Kenya, principally 
because no gang members and leaders have been arrested or prosecuted. Their rapport 
with senior political leaders has enabled some groups to operate with ease.  
37. Illegal groups are a threat to the security of communities: Although most extortion 
gangs emerge by providing social services and protection in urban neighbourhoods, they 
ultimately pose a security threat to community members by demanding protection fees. 
In places such as Kibera in Nairobi, these groups have illegally occupied rental houses 
belonging to persons displaced during the post-election violence or collect rent dues on 
them. The groups control the security of affected parts of the informal settlement and 
have thus entrenched themselves.6 Although community members may resort to illegal 
groups when in need of protection in urban neighbourhoods, previous survey reports 
show that many people prefer to receive security services from the police rather than 
these groups. The failure to arrest and prosecute those involved in post-election violence 
is likely to embolden the leaders of these groups, and especially those allied to senior 
politicians.  
Public perception of the International Criminal Court  
38. The government has made little progress in holding high-level perpetrators 
accountable, thus disillusioning the public: While the courts have dismissed several 
cases involving low-level perpetrators of the violence for lack of evidence, three years on, 
the government has made little progress in holding high level perpetrators to account. In 
2009, and on two occasions, Parliament failed to pass a Motion to establish a Special 
Tribunal for Kenya as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV). Despite having expressed unanimous support for implementing the 
CIPEV report’s recommendations, MPs voted against the tribunal: some considered it 
fatally flawed because of loopholes that allowed for presidential pardons, while others 
                                                
6 Interview with a member of the District Peace Committee, 12 May 2011 
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opposed it believing it might be effective and thus result in their prosecution or those of 
their allies. The International Criminal Court appeared less threatening to them as it was 
seen as likely to pursue only a handful of people in a process that could drag on for 
years.7 The failure to set-up the tribunal invited the ICC intervention as recommended by 
CIPEV. 
39. The ICC intervention in Kenya has aroused anxieties with political implications: The 
identification of senior and influential politicians from the two main parties as the main 
suspects in the ICC investigation into the violence has aroused political anxieties all 
round. In December 2010 when the ICC Prosecutor named the six suspects, political 
leaders quickly shifted their positions on the ICC and began to mobilise against its 
intervention. This development hamstrung the reform agenda as political attention 
shifted to strategies for securing political careers. On the whole, the intervention of the 
ICC has continued to weaken the functioning of the Grand Coalition Government.   
 
40. The public is concerned that not all perpetrators are held accountable: The previous 
review report noted that support for the ICC intervention was high. The public is 
nonetheless concerned that not all perpetrators have been held accountable. Some would 
have preferred to see low and middle level perpetrators arrested and successfully 
prosecuted.  
 
41. Some people are unhappy about the ICC intervention; complacency is gradually 
building: The length of time it is taking to resolve the issue of how to deal with post-
election violence is generating public fatigue. Up to 38 per cent of respondents said they 
are now unhappy about the ICC intervention. Some argue that not all perpetrators are 
being held to account and that the low level perpetrators are yet to be arrested and 
prosecuted. Others argue that it is taking long to bring justice to the victims. Still, there 
are others who are unhappy because they think the ICC intervention has been politicised, 
or that the local courts should try the suspects. Indeed, prior to honouring the April 2011 
summons by the ICC, some of the suspects conducted rallies particularly in Rift Valley 
Province, in which they pleaded their innocence. There were public claims that they had 
been set up by their rivals to jettison their political careers ahead of 2012 General 
Election.  
Table 4: How happy/unhappy are you that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects? 
  Total Nairobi Coast 
North 
Eastern Eastern Central 
Rift 
valley Western Nyanza 
Happy 51% 59% 75% 55% 50% 29% 36% 67% 69% 
Unhappy 38% 37% 14% 21% 38% 60% 55% 23% 19% 
Not sure 5% 2% 5% 5% 7% 7% 5% 5% 5% 
DK 4% 1% 7% 11% 5% 4% 3% 4% 6% 
RTA 1% 1% 0% 7% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
 
42. People in the regions that are home to some of the six suspects are unhappy with the 
ICC; they appear more complacent: An analysis shows that regions from which the 
suspects are drawn are more unhappy with the ICC compared to those where no one is 
being called to account: in Central Province, 60 per cent are not unhappy with the ICC 
while Rift Valley has 55 per cent expressing similar sentiments. Those outside these 
regions are happy with the ICC. The regional pattern of approval and disapproval 
suggests that the process of accountability is being politicised and ethnicised: criminal 
                                                
7 Sriram, Chandra Lekha and Stephen Brown, ‘The ICC, Kenya and Complementarity’ (forthcoming)  
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accountability is viewed through ethnic lenses. The culture of impunity and the general 
politicisation of the ICC intervention are responsible for this trend.  
 
43. Younger people are happy with the ICC: More young people (57%) below 24 years are 
happy with the ICC compared to people aged over 45 years (47%). Similarly, more urban 
dwellers (59%) are happy with the ICC compared to 47 per cent in rural areas. That is, 
there are relatively more people in urban areas who are happy with the ICC than in rural 
areas. This is an important observation: it suggests that people in rural and urban areas 
have different perspectives on how people should be held to account.  
 
44. People want justice: Up to 36 per cent of those who are happy with the ICC think it is a 
mechanism through which justice can be delivered to victims. Another 7 per cent think it 
will end impunity and 4  per cent think it will help to reveal the truth about the post-
election violence. Further, 71 per cent of respondents agree that ‘those supporting The 
Hague/ ICC action are mainly concerned with getting justice for victims of the PEV’. Only 
23 per cent disagree.  These findings reveal that people still want the ICC intervention to 
offer opportunities for delivering justice for the victims. 
 
45. Perceptions of unfair distribution of criminal responsibility are entrenched: Those who 
are unhappy with the ICC intervention in Kenya allege that the list of suspects is not 
complete and that the process has been politicised. The view by some people that the list 
is incomplete is based on arguments that the violence occurred in several areas and, 
therefore, suspects should be drawn from all the affected regions. Others observe that the 
majority of the suspects are from one ethnic group, thus betraying a lack of ethnic 
balance. Some people at the local level also argue that low-level perpetrators who carried 
out the attacks bear the greatest responsibility. They do not perceive the influential 
people as having been involved in these attacks. People do not see them as criminals; 
they are their leaders. This aspect imbues the suspects with heroism. Perceptions of 
unfair distribution of criminal responsibility continue to inform discourses of grievance 
at the community level.  
 
46. Succession politics is shifting attention away from how to hold people to account: The 
claims that the ICC ‘is being used’ to curtail the political ambitions of some of the 
suspects has raised public anxiety about the possibility of future violence. Public anxiety 
has been stoked by the ease with which rallies were mobilised before and after the visit to 
The Hague, and the tone of the speeches made. The rallies revealed that Kenya’s political 
culture has not changed since 2008. Divisions around the ICC are emerging as new fault 
lines around which conflict could occur. Thus a trader in Eldoret noted: ‘I realise we 
Kenyans as a people and our institutions have not learnt any lessons from 2008. We 
are still entertaining thoughts of violence, because that is what we do during the 
election year. This time my fear is worse because of the ICC.8 Indeed, the fear of violence 
during the election year has been aggravated by local discourses of political exclusion and 
victimisation of some communities. In particular, discourses linking the ICC to 2012 
succession politics have shifted attention away from individual criminal responsibility. 
 
47. Not everyone thinks the ICC is politicised; many agree the ICC is about justice for 
victims: The allegation that the ICC intervention has been captured by Kenyan politics is 
having some impact in changing people’s perception about the ICC intervention as a tool 
for delivering justice to the victims. Up to 53 per cent of the respondents agree that the 
fight against impunity has political undertones: they agree that politicians supporting 
                                                
8 Interview with a trader  in Eldoret, 14 June 2011 
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The Hague/the ICC action are mainly concerned with eliminating political opponents. 
However, the majority believe that the ICC is about getting justice for the victims: 
 Table 5: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Agree Disagree NR 
Those opposing The Hague/the ICC action are mainly trying to protect those 
who organised the PEV 
62% 38% 1% 
Those supporting The Hague/the ICC action in Kenya are mainly concerned 
with getting justice for victims of the PEV 
71% 29% 1% 
Politicians supporting the Hague/the ICC action are mainly concerned with 
eliminating political opponents 
53% 46% 1% 
If the six people named by The Hague/ICC prosecutor Ocampo are tried, 
political violence in the next General Election will be less likely 
64% 34% 2% 
 
48. Some people in regions that are home to the six suspects are not concerned with getting 
justice for victims: Respondents in regions where the six suspects hail from are more 
inclined to feel that the ICC is designed to eliminate political foes and rivals ahead of 
2012 rather than to fight impunity. Up to 70 per cent of respondents in Central, 62 per 
cent in Rift Valley, and 63 per cent in Eastern agree that the ICC is about eliminating 
political opponents. This contrasts with places such as Coast and Nyanza, where only 28 
per cent and 36 per cent, respectively, agree with this statement. Significant, however, is 
that well over half of the respondents across all ages and all ethnic groups agree that the 
ICC is intended to get justice for victims.  
Table 6: Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
  
49. Many people in Coast Province (82%) feel that those opposed to the ICC are seeking to 
protect those who organised the post-election violence. Still, Coast has relatively more 
people (94%) than other regions who are concerned about getting justice for victims of 
the post-election violence. Eastern, Rift Valley and Central have fewer people who agree 
… agreed with each of the following statements 
 
Statements: 
 
Total 
 
Nairobi 
 
Coast 
 
North 
Easter
n 
 
Eastern 
 
Central 
 
Rift 
valley 
 
Western 
 
Nyanza 
Those opposing The Hague/the ICC 
action are mainly trying to protect 
those who organised the PEV 
62% 69% 82% 73% 66% 47% 44% 66% 78% 
Those supporting The Hague/the ICC 
action in Kenya are mainly 
concerned with getting justice for 
victims of the PEV 
71% 78% 94% 64% 70% 55% 58% 79% 85% 
Politicians supporting The 
Hague/the ICC action are mainly 
concerned with eliminating political 
opponents 
53% 57% 28% 42% 63% 70% 62% 38% 36% 
If the six people named by The 
Hague/ICC prosecutor Ocampo are 
tried, political violence in the next 
General Election will be less likely 
64% 78% 78% 56% 59% 57% 50% 64% 84% 
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that the ICC is about justice for victims.  In the Rift Valley, this perception is tied to 
claims that local people also suffered during the post-election violence but have not 
received any humanitarian assistance.9 
Table 7: Choose one statement that is closest to your view. 
 
Please choose one statement that is closest to your view? 
 
 
Statements: 
Total Nairobi Coast 
North 
Eastern 
Eastern Central 
Rift 
valley 
Western 
Nyanza 
 
 
The six suspects named by 
the ICC prosecutor should 
be tried by ICC in The 
Hague 
55% 60% 79% 75% 55% 29% 33% 74% 78% 
The six suspects named by 
the ICC prosecutor should 
be tried by local tribunal in 
Kenya 
35% 35% 16% 19% 40% 58% 46% 22% 18% 
The six suspects named by 
the ICC prosecutor should 
NOT be tried at all 
9% 5% 5% 6% 4% 13% 20% 3% 5% 
 
50. Up to 90 per cent of respondents want those responsible for the post-election violence to 
be prosecuted -- either by the ICC or through a local tribunal in Kenya. This suggests that 
there is high public support for accountability to end the culture of impunity. 
Nonetheless, more people prefer the ICC to a local process, which means that public trust 
in institutions such as the Judiciary and investigating bodies is still lacking. This also 
implies that reforms undertaken in these institutions since the end of post-2007 election 
violence have not been deep enough; they have been cosmetic..  
 
51. Support for a local tribunal is highest in areas where the ICC suspects come from -- 
Central (58%), Rift Valley (46%) and Eastern (40%). More people in the suspects’ home 
areas support the view by some politicians that suspects should not be tried at all, that 
Kenyans need to forgive and forget or address the matter through non-punitive processes 
such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).  
 
52. Past reports have indicated that national level political conflicts trickle to the local level. 
In this regard, political support for the ICC at the national level is reflected in regions 
associated with the leaders. For instance, public support for the ICC intervention is 
strong in Nyanza, Eastern and Coast, where the Prime Minister has a strong following. 
North Eastern Province supports an external process due to lack of confidence in local 
institutions, given its long history of marginalisation and human rights abuses by state 
security agents that have included massacres.    
                                                
9 Interviews in Burnt Forest, June 2011  
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ICC and peace and security ahead of 2012 
53. Many people are of the view that violence will not occur if the ICC trials take place: Past 
reports have shown that the ICC intervention does not pose a serious threat to peace and 
stability in any part of Kenya. This view is still relevant. Up to 60 per cent of respondents 
think violence will not occur if the ICC trials take place. Only 18 per cent think violence 
will very likely occur. 
Table 8: If the ICC trials take place, how likely do you think it is there will be violence? 
 
54. While the view that the ICC trials may not trigger violence is still widespread, public 
perceptions appear to be changing as mobilisation for the 2012 General Election begins. 
The naming of ethnic leaders as suspects may have negatively impacted on support for 
prosecutions because local discourses have ethnicised the ICC intervention. Some people 
in regions where the six suspects come from are not supportive of the trials; they are in 
solidarity with their leaders.  
 
55. More than half of Kenyans are not confident that the police can to stop violence if it 
occurs in 2012: The realisation that no substantive steps have been taken to fight 
impunity for crimes committed in 2008 has increased fear that as 2012 approaches, 
existing deterrent mechanisms and the police may not be adequate to stop the violence. 
As many as 55 per cent of respondents are not confident that the police can stop violence 
related to elections if it occurs.  
 
Figure 2: How confident are you that the police can stop electoral violence if it occurs in 
2012? 
38%
55%
5%
1%
Confident
Not confident
Don't know
RTA
How confident are you that the police can stop political 
violence related to elections if it occurs in 2012?
 
 
  
Total Nairobi Coast 
North 
Eastern 
Eastern Central 
Rift 
valley 
Western Nyanza 
Very likely 18% 11% 13% 10% 14% 33% 24% 14% 17% 
Not likely 60% 73% 63% 44% 59% 43% 58% 75% 65% 
Not sure 16% 14% 16% 23% 21% 19% 14% 8% 13% 
DK 5% 2% 8% 19% 6% 5% 4% 3% 5% 
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56. Regions differ in terms of confidence in the police: Western, Coast, Nyanza and Nairobi 
have the least confidence in the ability of the police to stop violence if it occurs in 2012. 
The construction of new police stations and patrol bases in the Rift Valley seems to have 
only marginally increased public confidence in the ability of the police to stop violence. 
These findings have implications for the police -- capacity must be improved to address 
violence if it occurs. 
 
Table 9: How confident are you that the police can stop political violence related to elections 
if it occurs in 2012? 
 
57. Protection of witnesses and their families is still important: After the naming of the 
suspects, there have emerged local political discourses of victimisation in some 
communities. Allegations of direct and veiled threats to witnesses to help protect one of 
their own have increased. Human Rights institutions working with witnesses have 
reported a resurgence of intimidation to those perceived to be witnesses, or their close 
relatives.10 The arbitrary disappearance of suspected witnesses has caused fear among 
human rights defenders.  
 
58. Negative social consequences such as ostracisation of families perceived to have 
witnesses are evident: Some argue that there is covert intimidation of the families of 
witnesses. Sometimes relatives of those perceived to be witnesses put pressure on the 
families by warning them against bringing the wrath of the community upon their 
households. They are perceived as ‘traitors’. Individual members of households are under 
pressure from communities to demonstrate loyalty ‘to the community’ by not providing 
information lest they be construed as betraying their cause.11 That is, families associated 
with witnesses do not want to be viewed as enemies of the community; they are warning 
their members against going against the community.12  In addition, there are simple, 
everyday measures to discredit those viewed as witnesses. They are painted as 
incorrigibly dishonest and out to extort money from the suspects. Such people and their 
families are threatened with ‘a curse’ for attempting to give ‘false witness’ about events 
that occurred during the 2007/ 2008 violence. It is said the curse will befall the witness 
in question as well as members of their household for generations.13  
 
59. The suspects’ political supporters are mobilising community solidarity: The efforts 
above appear to be attempts to mobilise local ethnic support and loyalty for some of the 
suspects. Because of such efforts, some people at the local level are rethinking afresh 
issues around the post-election violence. Some now believe that the atrocities committed 
during the crisis were justified in the circumstances. Thus, they argue, nobody should be 
punished for the role they played in defending the community. In Nakuru, a respondent 
said: ‘We were being finished; something had to be done to control the situation.’ And in 
Uasin Gishu, a respondent observed: ‘Why should the ‘suspect’ suffer, yet it is the people 
                                                
10 Interview with human rights official in Uasin Gishu County, 11 June 2011 
11 Interview with a youth leader, Uasin Gishu County, 11 June 2011 
12 Interview with a young man in Uasin Gishu County, 14 June 2011 
13 FGD in Uasin Gishu County, 13 June 2011 
 Total Nairobi Coast North 
Eastern 
Eastern Central Rift 
valley 
Western Nyanza 
Confident 38% 35% 50% 26% 43% 37% 41% 34% 31% 
Not confident 55% 59% 41% 52% 51% 59% 53% 63% 64% 
Don't know 5% 6% 8% 18% 5% 4% 4% 3% 5% 
RTA 1% 0% 1% 4% 0% 1% 2% 0% 1% 
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and the community who were attacking? It is wrong and against our culture to isolate 
one person and hold him criminally responsible.’ 14 
 
60. Early preparation to prevent violence is critical: Early warning and preparedness 
measures can prevent the recurrence of violence. For instance, the heavy deployment of 
security forces during the 2010 referendum deterred violence because people were afraid 
the police would use excessive force. Ethnic minorities temporarily migrated to safer 
areas during the voting period. Interviews in much of the Rift Valley region indicate that 
migration might be a common coping strategy during the ICC hearings as well as ahead 
of 2012. 
Conclusions  
61. Lack of progress in addressing impunity is causing anxiety: National political 
discourses linking succession politics to the ICC intervention in the Kenya situation have 
increased public anxiety around uncertainties regarding the ICC outcome and the 2012 
General Election. These fears are fanned by the lack of progress in addressing impunity 
and undertaking reforms envisaged in 2008 to prevent the recurrence of violence. The 
number of Kenyans feeling uncertain about future peace and stability has increased over 
the past six months, and is bound to rise further as 2012 approaches.  The more the 
cleavages over succession politics at the national level and the ICC intervention, the more 
the divisions at the local level, especially in multi-ethnic areas.   
 
62. The legacy of post-election violence will dominate Kenya’s political agenda in the 
campaigns for 2012: The failure to fight impunity and the little progress made in 
arresting and prosecuting middle and lower level perpetrators have made Kenyans 
sceptical about political commitment to reforms in general. They also feel that very little 
can be done between now and 2012, because the window for reforms has closed and 
debate has shifted to the outcome of the ICC trials, as well as political positioning and 
consolidation of ethnic alliances for 2012.  
 
63. Reform of the police force and institutional reforms in general are critical:  Police and 
institutional reforms were prioritised under the KNDR process but no comprehensive 
policy and administrative changes have occurred in the police and the public service. The 
changes effected in the police have not had a significant impact at the community level. 
People are not confident that the police have the capacity to stop violence if it occurred in 
2012. They believe the police will employ force as witnessed during the post-election 
violence: attitudes and behaviour remain the same. Undertaking real and comprehensive 
reforms within the police is imperative, and the need is urgent especially because the 
period for the next election is around the corner. 
 
                                                
14 Interview with a university student, Uasin Gishu County, 15 June 2011 
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3. THE CHALLENGE OF RESETTLING IDPs 
 
Introduction 
64. The post-election violence spawned an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The National 
Accord thus required the parties to resolve the crisis and promote reconciliation. To 
achieve this, the government established the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement 
in the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MOSSP) and also set up the 
Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of post 2007 
Election Violence (Humanitarian Fund) to finance assistance and resettlement activities. 
In May 2008, the government launched Operation Rudi Nyumbani (Return Home) to 
facilitate durable solutions for IDPs.  
 
65. Through Operation Rudi Nyumbani, about half of the displaced persons have been able 
to go back to their homes and 384 refugee households have returned to Kenya from 
Uganda. The government has disbursed Ksh7.977 billion to pay relief and assistance 
funds to help IDPs start up their lives, reconstruct their damaged homes, and re-
establish their livelihoods.  
 
66. In March 2010, the Ministry of Special Programmes formulated a national policy for 
IDPs, the ‘National Policy on the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection 
and Assistance to IDPs in Kenya’. The draft, which provides guidelines for the protection 
and assistance to all categories of IDPs and persons forcibly displaced by various causes, 
has been awaiting Cabinet debate and approval for more than a year.  
 
67. Previous review reports have showed that the resettlement programme has faced many 
challenges, notably ineffective inter-ministerial coordination and allegations of 
embezzlement of funds meant for IDPs. Thus, despite allocating large sums of money to 
the resettlement programme, some IDPs continue to live in camps and other settings. 
The number of those waiting for funds, shelter or land allocation does not seem to 
diminish.  
 
68. This report provides a brief analysis of the problem of securing durable solutions for 
IDPs. It is noted here that lack of a policy framework, infiltration of non-IDPs into 
camps, landlessness and perceived favouritism of IDPs from one community confound 
efforts to find durable solutions.  
Operation Rudi Nyumbani  
69. The government has facilitated the return of refugees from Uganda and the return of 
IDPs; but 256 families are still refugees in Uganda: According to records from the 
Ministry of Special Programmes, 350,000 IDPs left their temporary shelters and 
returned to their homes.15 Those who felt insecure settled in transit camps near their 
homes, from where they commuted by day to cultivate their farms.  The government has 
facilitated the return of 384 households from Uganda; each returning household is given 
Ksh37,000 for logistical support. Another 256 families are still in Uganda and are 
expected to return to Kenya by the end of 2011.16  
 
                                                
15 Data provided by the Ministry of Special Programmes; see also presentation by the Permanent Secretary at the 
forum with members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on  Resettlement of IDPs, 23 May 2010 
16 Interview with senior official at the Ministry of Special Programmes, 23 May 2011 
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70.  There are reporting procedures to ensure transparency in the way administrators 
disburse funds: By the end of May 2011, the government had disbursed ex-gratia support 
of Ksh2, 262,290,000 to District Commissioners to pay IDPs. The money has been 
sourced from the government exchequer, grants, donations and a loan from the African 
Development Bank. To address the problem of corruption in the disbursement of funds, 
District Commissioners are required to account for the money. They file returns for 
monies they have received and disbursed.17 The Ministry of Special Programmes also 
supports the restoration of farm infrastructure and the rural livelihoods project, through 
which IDPs receive seeds, fertilises and farm inputs. 
The IDPs in camps and where they come from 
71. Some IDPs are still in camps because they were landless or were small traders before 
the violence: At the start of Operation Rudi Nyumbani in 2008, IDPs moved into 110 
transit camps, mostly in the Rift Valley. Those in the transit camps will benefit from the 
shelter reconstruction and livelihoods projects. By the end of May 2011, government 
records showed that there were only eight camps remaining in Kuresoi District. Some 
IDPs are in camps awaiting reconstruction of their homes while others were landless and 
have no farms to go to. Still, there are those who ran small businesses before the violence 
but are unable to re-start them. 
Table 10: Transit camps 
 Transit camp No. of HH
18
 Remarks / observations
19
  
1 Kamara DO’s camp 34 Original camps, formed Jan 2008 
2 Casino/Mosque Total 36 Landless IDPs; traders before displacement  
3 Kamara Centre  10 No camp; one tent left 
4 Kamuri  3 No camp; one tent remaining  
5 Langwenda  16 Waiting home reconstruction, some landless  
6 Karirikania  6 Waiting shelter construction, some squatters 
7 Keringet DO’s office 41 Mostly single mothers; traders 
8 Moto 13 No camp; live in donated houses 
 
72. The ministry does not recognise all transit camps. In Uasin Gishu County, there are four 
such camps: Kamuingi, Sakasaka, Naka and Maili Nne. IDPs in these camps do not own 
land. Most were squatters in Keiyo and Nandi districts. By the time they registered their 
self-help groups, the deadline for recognition of such groups by the MoSSP had lapsed. 20 
Similar groups are in Naivasha and Nyandarua districts and include New Canaan, Maua, 
Tumaini, Neema and Huruma.21 
 
73. Categories of IDPs: At the end of the emergency around 2008, the Early Recovery 
Cluster categorised IDPs according to livelihoods they pursued before displacement in 
order to expedite the search for durable solutions. The Cluster recognised that majority 
of the IDPs were farmers. However, not all farmers owned land; some were squatters or 
leased farms while living in urban areas. Farmers could be helped to return to their 
land, and most did return during Operation Rudi Nyumbani. Farmers who have not 
                                                
17 Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Special Programmes, 23 May 2011 
18 No of Households; Source: MOSSP records 
19 Conducted during an assessment mission in June 2011 
20Interview at MoSSP, 8 May 2011; interviews in Naivasha and Naka camp in Eldoret. Most IDPs in self-help 
groups that have not been formally recognised by the ministry complain that the failure to assist them because it 
delayed disbursing funds that they needed to purchase land. 
21 Fieldwork conducted in June 2011 
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returned to their farms, such as in Kondoo 1-3 Farm, or Kamuyu or Nyakinyua farms, 
have leased out their land or hired labourers to cultivate the land. Majority of landowners 
returned to their farms or have access to the farm from nearby urban centres. Those who 
were too traumatised to return have either sold or exchanged their land and bought new 
parcels or integrate in areas of refuge. 
 
74. Displaced landless people without any means to lease land are still in camps: Landless 
farmers who could return to lease land in pre-displacement areas did so in 2008. 
However, there are landless farmers who lost the chance to lease land due to ethnic 
tensions or landlords leasing to other people during the period of encampment. These 
farmers have relocated to new areas where they continue to lease land. Some pooled their 
share of Ksh10,000 and bought land in central Rift Valley, notably in Naivasha and 
Nakuru. Those who did not have any means constitute the IDPs still in camps 
  
75. There are IDPs who were traders: There are displaced business people or traders who 
lost all their stock during the violence. Some of the traders did not own land or houses. 
They lived in leased business premises, from which they were ejected or their stocks 
looted. Those among them who had capital have since re-established their businesses 
elsewhere. Those who lost everything or were unable to recover are still in the camps. 
Examples are those who ran businesses in towns where shops were razed such as Mau 
Summit. Others can be found at the Keringet DC’s office. Artisans such as mechanics and 
tailors also lost their work tools and have not re-established their livelihoods. Most 
business people are yet to receive support because the government’s livelihood recovery 
programme, through a UNDP grant, is tailored for farmers. The government does not 
compensate IDPs who were traders. 
 
76. Other IDPs included the squatters displaced in the previous waves of displacement. 
Unemployed people and the urban poor, including the homeless, were displaced during 
the violence. When Operation Rudi Nyumbani was launched and camps were 
dismantled, IDPs who had somewhere to go left the camps. A large number of IDPs were 
urban dwellers who had lived in rented housing. Some of these IDPs formed cooperative 
societies, or ‘self-help groups’ and collectively purchased large parcels of land, which they 
then subdivided into small plots. Concerned that this could create ‘slums in rural areas’, 
the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement at the Ministry of Special Programmes 
decided to support their efforts by buying for them economically viable pieces of land, on 
which social services could also be planned. 22 Thus, steps to allocate land to 6,802 
households in 19 ‘self-help groups’ was mooted in 2009.  
 
77. The government has found land for 1,337 households, at the following farms: 
                                                
22 Interview with senior official MoSSP, 23 May 2011 
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Table 11: Settled self-help groups 
 Where settled No. of Houses 
constructed 
No. of families settled 
 Giwa Farm 444 441 
 Managu Farm 56 56 
 Mau Summit Block  141 141 
 Rwangondu /66 - 
 
37 
 Rwangondu/67 - 
 Rwangondu/69 31 
 Nyandarua/Kiambaga/2 49 49 
 Asanyo Farm - 91 
 Marmanet/ Melwa/1497 & Marmanet/ 
Melwa/1365 
- 41 
 Kenjoketty/4   30 
 Endebbes/Kapkoi - 225 
    
 Total households settled  1,337 
 
78. The government did not explain the allocation criteria; squatters and others who did 
not have land moved to camps awaiting their share: The land allocation policy was not 
explained to all stakeholders, including government officials in other ministries.23 The 
fact that the government was allocating land to landless IDPs aroused interest from other 
IDPs, as every other landless IDP demanded similar consideration. At the same time, 
squatters who were not displaced demanded land. Ultimately, majority poor land-hungry 
people claimed to be IDPs in order to access land from the government. This caused a 
sudden increase in new camps – two years after the formal closure of PEV camps. It also 
occasioned an increase in the registration of ‘self-help groups’ by landless IDPs and 
others eager to benefit from the land allocation. Camps such as Ngeteti in Nyandarua and 
Wanaruona in Naivasha were formed in 2011.  The apparent attempt to benefit from 
displacement has caused claims that some IDPs are not genuine.  
 
79. Land allocation to IDPs has had several other negative consequences. IDPs in self-help 
groups who had not received any assistance from the government began to agitate for 
expedient resettlement. They complained that those in the 19 self-help groups had 
received more than their share of assistance – they already had the humanitarian fund 
(both the Ksh10,000 start-up fund and Ksh25,000 re-housing fund), continued food 
distribution, access to fertilisers and seed every season since 2008, their houses had been 
built for them and they have received land. This focus on one group of IDPs is perceived 
as unfair considering thousands of IDPs are still waiting to receive part of the money.24  
Similarly, those living with relatives and friends or invisibly in urban areas have not been 
systematically assisted.25  
 
                                                
23Some raise concern that the policy was not explained, including how the decision was reached: Interview with 
senior government official in the Ministry of State for Internal Security and Provincial Administration, 6 June 
2011   
24 FGDs in Kiambi, Tumaini, Neema, Amani Ndogo camps in Naivasha District, 3-5 June 2011 
25 Discussion at a forum with members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs, 23 May 
2011 
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80. There is concern that the government is biased in favour of IDPs from some 
communities: Concern that most of the beneficiaries of the land allocation programme 
are from one ethnic group has generated resistance against it. In the Rift Valley, 
resentment is rife over the fact that members of one community whose homes were burnt 
or who were injured have not been assisted. This has undermined peace efforts, 
particularly in areas such as Kamuyu where houses have been reconstructed. Some 
people in the area observe: ‘Our problem is not that they (IDPs) have been given 
houses… we feel bad because we also suffered, our houses were burnt, but nobody has 
assisted us.’26These claims of biases on ethnic lines could be the result of deep mistrusts 
and common discourses of exclusion that deepen animosity between communities. The 
discourses firm up especially when people are not given facts or explanations on how the 
reconstruction exercise is undertaken. 
 
81. Those evicted by the government are also demanding land before IDPs are resettled: 
Persons evicted from forests in order to conserve the environment and who are living in 
informal settlements around Mau, Embobut and other forests are demanding land before 
IDPs ‘from outside’ can be resettled on parcels considered to be their ancestral land. The 
Ministry of Special Programmes and the Lands ministry intend to settle 7,500 forest 
evictees. Some Ksh1.4b has been set aside for their resettlement. However, the focus on 
Mau Forest has provoked fears of exclusion among those evicted in earlier efforts to evict 
squatters from forest reserves such as Nabkoi Forest in Uasin Gishu and other locations 
in Nandi District. Similarly, evictees from Kipkurere, Ngatikong, Kasabei, Sengalu and 
others are seeking resettlement and have compiled registers of affected households.27   
 
82. Communities are resisting IDPs’ resettlement in areas they consider their ancestral 
land: Allocating land to IDPs has triggered interest regarding the criteria used to 
determine which landless people are settled. Because of this, there are those who argue 
that the government is using displacement as a smokescreen to give land to members of 
one community at the expense of deserving local landless people, including forest 
evictees. In effect, communities have risen up to resist the resettlement of IDPs on ‘their’ 
ancestral land. They claim that there are IDPs and landless people in areas where the 
government has procured land. Belated consultations with community leaders and 
members of IDP communities before resettlement have not resolved these concerns. In 
places such as Chemusian in Eldoret, Endebbes in Trans-Nzoia  and Tippis in Mau 
Narok, local people threatened to seize and occupy the land allocated to IDPs.  
                                                
26 FGD in Kamuyu area, Burnt Forest, 11 June 2011  
27 Interviews and FGDs in North Rift, June 2011 
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Figure 3: Are communities justified to reject IDPs? Yes, because ... 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
They should go back where they were displaced from
Because these communities have their own 
IDPs/Landless people
IDPs should go to their ancestral Districts
IDPs are viewed as foreigners
They may bring insecurity to the area
IDPs are fake
Have dialogue with local people
NR
56%
19%
12%
6%
3%
2%
1%
1%
Are these communities justified to reject resettlement of IDPs? 
Yes, because ... (by total)
 
83. Not all Kenyans support rejection of IDPs resettlement in what is considered as other 
people’s area. Up to 42 per cent of respondents said they were aware of IDPs being 
rejected. Over half those who are aware feel those who reject resettlement of IDPs in 
their area are not justified to do so. One point to stress here then is that rejection of IDPs 
is linked to identities and demand to control resources on the basis of exclusive 
identities. It generally reflects concerns about access to resources, particularly land. As 
Kenya transitions into the new constitution with a devolved government expected at the 
local level and the 2012 elections approach, IDPs are being perceived as voters whose 
political support can change political balance at the local level. But of concern are the 
growing trends to exclude communities on the basis of ethnicity. This is more 
pronounced on matters of politics and therefore access to resources at the local level. 
This trend has the consequence of creating super minorities at the county level. 
 
84. Many people would like IDPs to be resettled in the places where they were displaced 
from: As many as 42 per cent of respondents consider the place where IDPs were evicted 
from to be their home. Another 23 per cent believe the home of IDPs is anywhere in 
Kenya while 13 per cent think it is where they have bought land and settled. Only a small 
group – 21 per cent -- believe the home of IDPs is in their ancestral districts. These 
findings suggest that local leaders who mobilise communities to reject IDPs are the main 
obstacle to resettlement efforts and even reconciliation. Kenyans generally do not mind 
IDPs being resettled where they were displaced from or anywhere else in the country.    
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Figure 4: Where do you consider to be home for IDPs? 
Their ancestral districts/counties where their 
ethnic kin li
Places from which they fled
Where they have bought land/property and 
settled since being
Any part of Kenya
21%
42%
13%
23%
where do you consider to be home for IDPs?
 
Conclusion 
85. Resettlement efforts have not considered all categories of IDPs: The government has 
allocated resources for the resettlement of IDPs. However, the number of camps and 
displaced households does not seem to reduce. This is due to lack of a comprehensive 
policy to address the needs of all categories of IDPs, a challenge made more complex by 
the lack of comprehensive and disaggregated data on IDPs. The decision by the Ministry 
of Special Programmes to allocate land to landless IDPs has opened a Pandora’s Box, as 
other landless people including squatters have also demanded land. Resentment over 
perceived favouritism of IDPs from one community and inadequate consultation with 
communities in regions where the government has purchased land for resettlement have 
triggered rejection of IDPs, hence protracting displacement and encampment. But local 
leaders are responsible for these trends in the rejection of IDPs resettlement. Ordinary 
Kenyans do not mind IDPs being resettled. 
 
86. There are land-hungry imposters seeking to cash in on government support for IDPs: 
As 2012 elections approach, the government needs to take immediate measures to 
unravel the identity and origin of all the IDPs in camps. A number of land-hungry 
imposters seeking to benefit from government assistance programmes have infiltrated 
camps, while original households have multiplied because adult children register 
individual households.  The government should also profile the IDPs according to 
livelihoods or land ownership in order to assess recovery needs and provide support 
towards achieving appropriate durable solutions. 
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4. THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND REFORMS 
 
Introduction 
87. The agreement on the principles of partnership of the Coalition Government signed by 
the two parties – PNU and ODM -- stipulated that power sharing was not an end in itself 
but a means to achieving reforms that would prevent future violence. It was ‘not about 
creating positions that reward individuals.’28 It was about ‘enabling leaders to look 
beyond partisan considerations with a view to promoting the greater interests of the 
nation as whole.’ In addition, the agreement committed the parties ‘to work together as 
true partners, through constant consultations and willingness to compromise,’ in order 
to undertake fundamental and critical reforms. 
88. With power sharing and no formal opposition party in Parliament, it was expected that 
the government would be in a position to make hard decisions and undertake important 
reforms expeditiously. Political will, consultations and willingness to compromise were 
underlined as necessary for the passage of critical laws.  
89. Since its formation, the government has not been able to cultivate adequate consensus 
and cohesion. As previous review reports have shown, this has slowed the pace of 
reforms and entrenched the public perception of ‘two-governments-in-one’. Ethnic, 
sectarian and political interests have overridden the reform agenda. Combined, narrow 
partisan interests are informing implementation of reforms, thereby slowing their pace. 
90. This section of the report examines the status of the coalition government. It looks at 
coherence within the Coalition Government, how critical reforms have been undertaken 
and how lack of cohesion and consensus has impacted on the implementation of reforms. 
It examines the main achievements and challenges of the Coalition Government. 
Power sharing government and implementation of reforms 
91. Failure to compromise is a threat to reforms: In coalition governments, the elites’ 
political will to compromise, consult and negotiate is critical for moving forward with the 
reform agenda. Unity of purpose is central in this respect. Elites are required to 
transcend ethnic and personal differences to further reforms. Failure to compromise and 
overcome parochial differences weakens not only the coalition, but also threatens 
implementation. 
92. The two Principals have projected an image of ‘a unified executive’: Since its formation 
three years ago, the Grand Coalition has faced challenges of cohesion that have slowed 
the implementation of reforms. Lack of cohesion between the two partners and even 
within the parties that form the government, as well as in Parliament have tended to 
constrain implementation of reforms, including those in the new constitution. However, 
in recent times, both the President and Prime Minister have projected an image of ‘a 
unified executive’ or centre of power; they have avoided open acrimony. They have 
publicly pledged to support implementation of the constitution and acted together over 
the staffing of senior positions in the Judiciary by endorsing recommendations of the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The image of ‘one executive’ has created conductive 
conditions for speeding up implementation of the new constitution. Unfortunately, the 
image of partnership that they have demonstrated is not evident among their key 
supporters within Parliament. 
                                                
28Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, available at www.dialoguekenya.org 
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93. The public rates the two factions differently:  The public is generally sensitive to the 
acrimonious debates between the two coalition partners. In the past, the public has 
generally viewed the coalition as ‘two-governments-in-one’ – a largely divided one 
without a common purpose. This is usually reflected in the ratings the government 
receives with regard to performance in a number of areas. People tend to rate the two 
sides of the coalition differently. 
Table 12: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with with Kibaki-PNU and Raila-ODM with 
regard to the following issues 
  PNU ODM 
  
 
Dissatisfied Satisfied DK Dissatisfied Satisfied DK 
Prosecution of PEV 
perpetrators 
58% 36% 6% 47% 48% 5% 
Fighting corruption 63% 33% 3% 54% 43% 
3% 
 
Lowering the price of 
essential 
commodities 
78% 18% 3% 72% 25% 3% 
Fighting tribalism 65% 29% 4% 58% 38% 
4% 
 
94. People are most dissatisfied with the two partners with regard to their failure to lower 
the prices of essential commodities: The respondents rated the government poorly on its 
ability to lower the prices of essential commodities. People are also dissatisfied with the 
two partners’ commitment to fight corruption and impunity. In other words, there is a 
high sense of dissatisfaction with the government’s commitment to important political 
reforms: corruption, impunity or post-election violence, and tribalism. These are the 
major fault lines of conflict that require managing as the country moves towards the 2012 
elections.  
95. Lack of common positions on critical national issues such as corruption and the ICC 
intervention has deepened the fault lines: The partners in the coalition have not taken a 
collective stand on how to manage the ICC process or fight against corruption. From 
December 2010 when the ICC identified six suspects for prosecution, the Principals and 
their parties have issued contradictory and opposing views on the position of the 
Coalition Government. While those in PNU have argued for deferral of the Kenyan case 
and even lobbied the African Union and United Nations Security Council to assist in 
attaining this goal, ODM declined to support the initiative, arguing that the Cabinet did 
not resolve to do so. They dismissed the effort as a partisan and personal agenda. The 
government had also challenged the admissibility of the six ICC cases but ODM has said 
it is not party to these efforts.  
96. Divisions within government are reflecting on critical decisions: Lack of consensus on 
important issues exposes reforms to politics. Individual leaders tend to drive reforms on 
narrow considerations – the reforms are identified with the party or individuals in the 
coalition, thereby reducing their significance. Success or failure of reforms is thus 
attributed to individuals rather than the Coalition Government: ‘whenever a taskforce is 
formed within a ministry, it is labelled either PNU or ODM depending on the minister’s 
party… bureaucratic support to the taskforces is also dependent on the agenda of the task 
force or even the minister driving it’.29 For this reason, some MPs support or oppose 
parliamentary Bills on the basis of parochial considerations, including the minister’s 
party. This has undermined the parties’ capacity to make hard decisions on important 
                                                
29 Interview with a policy analyst and academic, 7 June 2011 
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national issues.  
97. Divisions delay decisions and lead to horse trading: Government operations are also 
suffering from these divisions and conflicts in the coalition. Divisions in the government 
tend to delay decision-making: ‘Divisions delay making of decisions and 
implementation of key activities ... Decisions tend to be influenced by succession politics 
and horse trading among partners’.30 Some of the officials interviewed also noted that 
‘there is absence of good faith, which is necessary for true and genuine bi-partisanship 
… absence of good faith has contributed to unnecessary suspicions.”31  
98. There is no institutionalised mechanism for resolving disputes within the coalition: Lack 
of structures to build consensus and cohesion within the coalition has led to the conflicts 
escalating and affecting reforms. The Permanent Committee on the Management of 
Coalition Affairs has not been effective. This body, comprising Cabinet ministers from 
both parties, would have created an enabling environment for the formulation and 
implementation of important reforms and for resolving disputes.  
99. Kenyans want the two principals to work together: Generally, Kenyans want the 
coalition to work as one government. They want to see a sense of togetherness in order to 
prevent conflict. Indeed, when asked what the coalition government can do to work 
better until the next elections, 40 per cent of Kenyans say the Principals should consult 
and work together. 29 per cent want the political leaders to be united. 
Figure 5: Please tell me ONE thing that the coalition government can do to work better until 
next General Election? 
 
100. The inability to have a common position on key governance reforms is dividing the 
government yet again: Conflicts over power sharing have resurfaced, especially with 
appointments to the new offices created under the 2010 constitution. Some of the 
politicians in PNU argue that the two Principals are not legally equal and that the 
President has the final word on key decisions. In addition, they argue that the 
                                                
30 Interview with a government official, 16 June 2011 
31 Interview with a senior government official, 3 June 2011 
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requirement for consultations does not imply consensus, something they say is difficult 
to achieve. However, ODM argue that the spirit of the National Accord, as well as the 
transitional clauses in the constitution state that the Prime Minister and President 
should consult and agree on key decisions. To them, the spirit of the new constitution is 
far more critical and ought to be respected. Polarisation resulting from these disputes has 
rapidly shifted the focus of the debate away from reforms to consolidation of political 
power and ethnic interests.  
101. People’s confidence in government has reduced; some feel they like nothing about the 
Coalition Government: These arguments over power sharing have obstructed 
implementation of reforms and the fight against impunity, impacting on people’s 
confidence in the Coalition Government in service delivery. When asked about what they 
perceived as the main achievements of the Coalition Government, 35 per cent of 
respondents said ‘nothing.’ 
Figure 6: What do you like most about the Coalition Government? 
 
102. The constant wrangles within government have diverted energies from service delivery, 
leading to disillusionment with the public. Indeed, 33 per cent of respondents cite 
political wrangles within the coalition as one of the failures of the government. Another 
46 per cent cite failure to arrest high food prices as its main failure. 
24  
  
Figure 7: What do you dislike most about the Coalition Government? 
 
 
103. People dislike the Coalition Government because of the high cost of living: Across the 
regions, all the respondents named high food prices as the main failure of the coalition. It 
is important for the coalition to urgently address the concern of high food prices since, as 
it has been seen elsewhere, it is a source of civil tension and instability. 
Table 13: What do you dislike most about the Coalition Government? (Across the regions) 
 
 Nairobi Coast North 
Eastern 
Eastern Central Rift 
valley 
Western Nyanza 
High 
commodity 
prices 
27% 51% 39% 49% 49% 45% 53% 53% 
Failure to 
fight 
corruption 
9% 9% 30% 13% 13% 8% 10% 8% 
Political 
wrangles 
53% 33% 20% 27% 28% 37% 28% 32% 
Failure to 
deal with 
insecurity 
3% 1% 10% 2% 4% 5% 3% 2% 
Failure to 
resettle IDPs 
5% 2% 2% 3% 5% 2% 3% 1% 
Dont know 
1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 3% 
1% 
 
104. Disagreements among leaders stemming from personal and ethnic interests undermine 
public considerations. The partners and the various factions appear to compete on what 
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reforms to support and how to implement them.32 This is affecting objective 
implementation of the constitution. This was evident during the parliamentary debate on 
the vetting of nominees for the positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and 
Director of Public Prosecutions. While the names for the Chief Justice and his Deputy 
were widely accepted, individuals and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) raised integrity 
questions with regard to the nominee for the post of DPP.  The allegations against the 
DPP were debated in and out of Parliament in ethnic and political tones.33 Some were 
oblivious to the fact that the new institutions are pillars of the nation and that public 
officials occupying them are trustees of the Kenyan public.  
105. Ethnic and partisan considerations are besmirching new institutions of governance: 
The new institutions created by the constitution risk losing public support when 
parochial and ethnic considerations shape how they are established. Again, the 
nomination of the DPP and how MPs debated it clearly shows that politics has the 
potential of undermining the reputation of these institutions. In Parliament, MPs vilified 
those who had brought the allegations against the nominee for the post of DPP.34 In 
addition, a section of MPs threatened to decline supporting nominees for the Judiciary if 
the nominee for DPP was not approved.35 In the end, debate over the DPP appointment 
polarised the political elite along personal and ethnic lines. These disputes shifted the 
focus of the debate away from reforms to the consolidation of power. It also revealed that 
Kenya is yet to transcend from the older order to a new one. 
106. The process of vetting state officials is highly approved: The judicial and prosecution 
office holders were the first to be vetted and hired under the new constitution. The 
exercise offered important lessons for the future as the constitution implementation 
process continues. Most of the political elites are yet to embrace the spirit of the 
constitution.36 Ethnicity and party loyalties are still driving their decision making. To 
effectively insulate the country from ethnicity and political considerations, the vetting 
bodies will be required to build capacity, including in areas such as interviewing of 
candidates, among others.  
107. The bureaucracy is not neutral: Within the government, the bureaucracy is exerting its 
influence through divisions within the coalition.37 There are turf wars among bureaucrats 
in various ministries. Their aim is to influence the drafting of legislation that touches on 
their ministries.38 Because of this competition and general absence of coherence in 
government, it is possible that they will draft weak legislation mostly because they want 
the status quo to remain.39  
108. Interest in how legislation is drafted is fuelling conflicts: Some argue that interest in 
drafting legislation is the main factor informing the internal conflicts in the 
parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and the Administration of Justice. The MPs 
would want to chair the committee or have a majority number to protect personal 
interests that may be threatened by the new constitution. The committee became 
dysfunctional owing to internal conflicts among members who were divided along party 
lines. The divisions prevented the committee from performing its tasks. The Speaker of 
the National Assembly had to pass some of the responsibilities to the Constitutional 
Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC). 
                                                
32 Interview with a Senior Counsel, 8 June 2011 
33 ‘Ntimama now asks Parliament to approve Tobiko,’ The Star, 14 June 2011 
34 ‘ Baraza and Tobiko get house nod’, Daily Nation, 15 June 2011 
35 ‘Nominees: Tobiko’s approval divides MPs,’ The Standard, 14 June 2011 
36 Interview with a Senior Counsel, 8 June 2011 
37 Interview with a policy analyst, 2 June 2011 
38 Interview with a government official, 16 June 2011 
39 Interview with a committee member of the devolution taskforce, 2 June 2011 
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109. Kenyans want focused leadership: Perhaps because of these divisions, many Kenyans 
prefer focused leadership to ‘ethnic’-based  political alliances. Asked what kind of 
leadership they wanted, 62 per cent of respondents said they wanted a focused leadership 
in power rather than an ethnic-based alliance. 
Figure 8: Please choose one statement that is closest to your view. 
 
110. Honesty and integrity – or Chapter Six of the Constitution – are highly regarded as 
values for leadership of the county government. Most people rank integrity and 
transparency high on the qualities of the person they would choose as a Governor in the 
next elections. 
Figure 9: What should be the most important quality of a county governor? 
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Conclusion 
111. Conflicts within the coalition will slow reforms; but the new Constitution will outlive 
them: Conflicts within the Coalition Government will continue slowing down decision 
making. But the new constitution has mechanisms to insulate itself from the 
consequences of these conflicts. Public litigation measures and oversight on the 
government are important in this respect. 
112. Compromise and consultation between the two Principals is critical at this stage: The 
solution to the main problems of implementing reforms lies in consultations between the 
two Principals. Divisions between them and a perception that they are not ‘together’ is 
creating opportunities for entrenching the status quo or drafting weak legislation because 
of the fear of change. 
113. Ethnic-based interests have resurfaced: The constitutional reforms were intended to 
eliminate the salience of ethnicity in politics. The constitution does this by defining the 
nature and functions of the state, aiming at an inclusive nation in which members of all 
communities are represented and play a part. In addition, the constitution emphasises 
on a Kenyan identity and nation building, in which ethnicity will be respected but only as 
part of the cultural richness of the country. Hence, in the debate on the appointment of 
office holders, emphasis should be on Kenyan citizenship, national unity and service to 
the nation. Aspects of integrity, transparency and impartiality are critical for the current 
implementation process and must take precedence over ethnicity. 
114. Unity of purpose in Parliament is critical for passing important Bills: Parliament’s unity 
of purpose is urgently needed especially at this time when it is supposed to pass critical 
Bills that will ensure the country has free and fair elections devoid of any violence. 
Politicians need to recall the underlying foundations of the coalition, that no party could 
govern without the other -- hence progress in the reform agenda will not be realised if 
they refuse to accomodate each other. The future stability of the country is tied to the full 
implementation of the new constitution. Hence, all efforts need to be geared towards this 
agenda.  
115. The clock is ticking fast towards the next General Election. Hard decisions have to be 
made. Institutional deficiencies that led to the 2007/8 violence are supposed to be 
addressed with the constitution, which was passed by a majority vote. If they are not 
addressed, the country risks being plunged into chaos once again. Key among these 
reforms is the transforming the judiciary and police, as well as delivering on the entire 
Agenda 4 framework that identified the root causes of the violence. It is thus important 
that all players exhibit sobriety so that the process can be steered to fruition. It is 
important that all stakeholders stay faithful to the process. 
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5. THE NEW CONSTITUTION: LONG TERM ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
 
Introduction 
116. It is now widely acknowledged that institutional failure and the divisions emanating from 
Kenya’s constitutional review process in 2005 contributed to the post-2007 election 
violence. The KNDR agreement underscored the importance of undertaking far-reaching 
reforms in order to move the country forward.  
 
117. In particular, Agenda Item 4 recognised the importance of fast-tracking constitutional 
and institutional reforms as well as other issues around which Kenyans were divided. 
Land reforms, tackling unemployment and addressing regional development imbalances 
were identified as critical aspects of the reform agenda for the Coalition Government. 
Important also, in this respect, was the need to consolidate national cohesion and unity, 
and attack the cause of impunity by embedding reforms that would promote a culture of 
accountability and transparency in public affairs. 
 
118. In line with Agenda Item 4, a new constitution was promulgated in August 2010. The 
new constitution has fundamentally altered the structure of government and governance, 
especially by providing for national and county governments. There are new legislative 
bodies and an electoral system to address the problem of representation of groups that 
have traditionally been marginalised and are vulnerable. The constitution had self-
imposed deadlines on drafting of key legislation. It also imposes certain sanctions on 
various state officers and institutions if they fail to meet these deadlines.   
 
119. August 2011 will mark one year after the promulgation of the constitution. It is 
important, therefore, to examine the progress of implementation of the constitution as 
well as other reforms that would prevent another crisis. This section of the report thus 
discusses progress in implementing the constitution and institutional reforms in general.  
Constitution implementation process 
120. A number of independent institutions to undertake and oversee the implementation of 
the new constitution have been established. The government is in the process of 
developing various policy and legislative frameworks for the comprehensive 
implementation of the constitution. The government established the Constitutional 
Implementation Commission (CIC) on 30 December 2010 with a mandate to oversee, 
monitor and facilitate the implementation of the new constitution.40 The commission has 
set up its secretariat and established networks with various stakeholders engaged in 
implementing the constitution.41  
 
121. Schedule 5 of the constitution lists 16 laws that must be enacted by 27 August 2011. 
However, by early June 2011, only three Bills have been passed into law: the Judicial 
Service Act; the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act; and the Supreme Court Act. The 
CIC has further identified priority laws that should be passed by August 2011.42  
 
                                                
40 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Act 
41 http://cickenya.org.  
42 CIC. Agreed timelines for the development of priority Bills for the period ending 30 August 2011. 
http://cickenya.org 
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Table 14: Name, timeline and status of Schedule 5 Bills 
 Bill Constitutional 
(Schedule5) 
Deadlines 
New 
(CIC) 
deadlines 
Status 
1.  Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission  
 
26 August 2011 
 
15 May 2011 
 
Awaiting presidential assent 
2.  Kenya National Human 
Rights and Equality 
Commission  
26 August 2011 03 July 2011 3 Bills under review
43
 
3.  
Legislation on Citizenship 26 August 2011 25 August 2011 
Undergoing internal review 
& stakeholder consultations 
4.  
Ethics and Anti-Corruption  26 August 2011 17 July 2011 
Undergoing internal review 
& stakeholder consultations 
5.  
Legislation on Elections 26 August 2011 08 July 2011 
Undergoing internal review 
& stakeholder consultations 
6.  
Electoral Disputes 26 August 2011  
Merged into the Elections 
Bill 
7.  Legislation on Political 
Parties 
26 August 2011 26 June 2011 
Awaiting approval by 
Cabinet 
8.  Vacation of Office of 
Member of Parliament Bill  
26 August 2011   
9.  
Power of Mercy  26 August 2011 30 May 2011 
 
 
10.  
System of Courts 26 August 2011 28 August 2011 
Supreme Court Act enacted 
22 June 2011 
11. 
Removal from Office   
 
 
12.  Legislation on Vetting of 
Judges and Magistrates 
Schedule 
26 August 2011  
Vetting of Judges and 
Magistrates Act passed, 21 
March 2011 
13.  Speaker of County Assembly 
Bill 
26 August 2011   
14.  
Urban areas and Cities Bill 26 August 2011 14 August 2011 
 
 
15.  
Contingencies Fund 26 August 2011  
 
 
16.  Loan Guarantees by National 
Government 
26 August 2011  
 
 
                                                
43 Article 59 of the constitution provides for the merger of the Kenya National Human Rights Commission 
(KNCHR), the National Gender Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. These are the three commissions 
expected to form the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission. The KNCHR and Ombudsman 
Bill are awaiting approval by Cabinet while the National Gender Commission Bill is undergoing review and 
stakeholder consultations. 
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Table 15: Timelines and status of CIC priority Bills44 
 Bill Constitutional 
(Schedule5) 
Deadlines 
New 
(CIC) 
deadlines 
Status 
1. 
Public Service Commission  30 July 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
2. 
Independent Offices   30 May 2011 
Before Parliament for 
debate 
3. 
Auditor-General and Controller 
of Budget 
 03 August 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
4.  
Public Financial Management 26 August 2012 03 August 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
5. Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission 
 15 May 2011 
Awaiting presidential 
assent 
6.  
Ethics and Leadership 26 August 2012 16 August 2011 
 
 
7.  
Ratification of Treaties  21 August 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
8.  
Independent Police Oversight 
Authority 
 18 August 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
9.  
Nations Police Service 26 August 2012 
14 September 
2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
10.  
NSIS 26 August 2012 
16 September 
2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
11.  
National Police Service 
Commission 
26 August 2012 7 July 2011 
Undergoing internal 
review & stakeholder 
consultations 
12.  
National Land Commission 26 March 2012 03 August 2011 
 
 
Challenges to the implementation of the constitution 
122. Critical Bills on elections are yet to be passed: With just over a year to the next 
scheduled elections, the laws to ensure a free, fair and credible election are still not in 
place. The lack of a legal and institutional infrastructure to manage elections undermines 
confidence in the electoral and democratic processes. It also implies that electoral 
management systems will likely not have sufficient time to make the preparations 
necessary to secure and assure the integrity of the vote. 
 
123. A conservative political culture and the old order threaten implementation: The reforms 
in the new constitution generally challenge the entrenched power structures, old values 
and habits, as well attitudes. But these are so entrenched that it will take time to build a 
                                                
44 This table outlines additional Bills the CIC considers to be a priority to the implementation of the constitution. 
While some are not explicitly provided for under Schedule 5 of the constitution, majority have had their timelines 
brought forward with the aim of fast-tracking the implementation process.  
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base for new values. Indeed, the recent appointments to the Judiciary, applicants were 
questioned on matters of faith, yet the constitution is built on the aspiration to build a 
new and open society. It appears as if there are new fears, among some, about the radical 
repositioning of the Kenyan society.  
 
124. The constitution was negotiated; it contains ambiguities that will require further legal 
clarification: The constitution contains language ambiguities that may lead Parliament 
to debate the meaning of some of the provisions. Already there are several cases in court 
seeking judicial interpretation of some of the provisions. Those who opposed the 
constitution at the referendum are increasingly using this language ambiguity to force 
interpretations that favour them. Further, even those who supported the document do 
not agree about the interpretation of some of the provisions. This will remain a challenge 
throughout the constitution implementation process. 
 
125. Civic education is lacking. Important also is that civic education appears to have stopped 
with the referendum. For instance, the survey asked how much people knew about the 
new constitution. Only 10 per cent of respondents said they knew ‘a lot’ while 65 per cent 
said they knew ‘nothing’. Important, however, is the finding that 65 per cent know ‘just 
some of it’.  
Figure 10: How much would you say you know about the new constitution? 
 
 
126. Popular forums for public education such as the Internet, chief’s baraza, and schools 
are not providing civic education on the constitution. The media remain the main source 
of knowledge about the new constitution. Up to 82 per cent of respondents identified the 
media as their main source of information on the new constitution while only 42 per cent 
said they had read the document. Only 6 per cent built their knowledge through civic 
education delivery groups such as professional associations and civil society 
organisations. The main forums of public education do not give any knowledge on the 
constitution: in the survey, schools, chief’s baraza, e-learning were not cited as sources of 
information and knowledge about the constitution.  
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Table 15: What are the sources of what you know about the constitution? 
Media 82% 
Friends/Relatives 42% 
Personally read the constitution 48% 
Politicians/Political parties 11% 
Religious leaders 9% 
Employer 0% 
Professional associations 2% 
NGOs workshops/forums 4% 
Internet 0% 
Taught in School by Teachers 0% 
Chiefs in barazas 0% 
Civic education 0% 
Government offices 0% 
NR/RTA DK 2% 
127. Many people are not aware about elective posts under the new constitution. Besides the 
seats of the President and Member of Parliament (MP), only 11 per cent of Kenyans are 
aware that they will be required to vote for women representatives in the next General 
Election. Just 16 per cent of the respondents know that they will to vote for youth 
representatives.  
 
128. Lack of cohesion in both Parliament and within the Coalition Government is slowing 
the pace of constitution implementation. The discussion above cited lack of cohesion in 
government as delaying decision-making and implementation of reforms in general. This 
applies to implementation of the constitution as well. The new constitution has 
restructured the state and its institutions. It therefore faces the challenge of resistance 
from those who support the status quo as well as the old political culture. Divisions along 
party lines within Parliament’s departmental committee on Justice, Legal Affairs and 
Administration of Justice considerably slowed the process of making judicial 
appointments.45  
 
129. The disagreements within the Coalition Government are also reflected in what people 
perceive to be major threats to implementing the constitution. In the June 2011 survey, 
40 per cent of the respondents cited political wrangles between coalition partners as the 
greatest challenge to the implementation of the constitution. Another 21 per cent said 
self-interest among political leaders was an impediment to the implementation process 
while 13 per cent felt that delays in Parliament were hindering the implementation of the 
constitution.   
 
                                                
45 Daily Nation, ‘MPs Reject Namwamba as ODM quits’, Friday, 6 May  2011. Pg72 
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Figure 11: What ONE difficulty, if any, do you see facing the implementation of the 
constitution? 
 
 
 
130. The implementation challenges are undermining public confidence in the constitution. 
Up to 47 per cent of respondents said they are not satisfied with the progress of 
implementation. This is a significantly high level of dissatisfaction and could be the result 
of disillusionment with the growing tendency by some leaders to undermine the 
provisions of the new constitution. There are several public litigation cases in court 
seeking to prevent this tendency.  
Tabl16: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with progress in implementing the new 
constitution? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131. The media are viewed as having increased people’s knowledge on several other issues. Up 
to 85 per cent of the respondents said that media coverage had increased their knowledge 
of the ICC. Another 85 per cent and 81 per cent said media coverage has improved their 
knowledge of provisions of the constitution and the problem of IDPs, respectively.  
Table 17: Has media coverage increased your knowledge of the following issues? 
  Yes No DK NR 
How the ICC operates 85% 13% 1% 1% 
Provisions of the new constitution 81% 16% 2% 1% 
The problem of IDPs in Kenya 84% 13% 2% 1% 
 
132. People have also noticed changes after the adoption of the new constitution. Of those 
surveyed, 42 per cent said that there is transparent recruitment and vetting of 
government officials, while 15 per cent said there is reduced harassment by police. 
Very satisfied 5% 
Satisfied 35% 
Not satisfied 33% 
Not satisfied at all 14% 
DK 11% 
NR 1% 
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Figure 12: What change have you observed in the county since the adoption of the new 
constitution? 
 
Judicial reforms 
133. In adherence to the constitution, the Judicial Service Commission has interviewed and 
recommended to Parliament candidates for judicial appointments. The interviews were 
conducted in public. This is a clear break with the past. It is a radical opening of the 
doors to the Judiciary.46 The extent of public participation in the process has improved 
public confidence in judicial reforms, which have not been fully implemented, even 
though KNDR prioritised them.  
 
                                                
46 Interview with an official of KHRC, June 2011 
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Figure 13: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the government in addressing judicial 
reforms? 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Dissatisfied Satisfied DK/RTA
32%
53%
14%
 
 
134. A new Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Director for Public Prosecutions have been 
appointed. The three were sworn in on 16 June 2011, setting the stage for reforms in the 
country’s justice system.47 Some of the priority areas for both the Chief Justice and 
Deputy Chief Justice will include vetting of serving judicial officers, improving public 
access to justice and clearing the case backlog in the superior and subordinate courts.48  
 
135. The Supreme Court Bill has been passed into law. The Act is intended to provide the legal 
and institutional framework for offsetting up the Supreme Court. The court, once 
established, will hear presidential election disputes and interpret the constitution when 
called upon to do so.49  This is an important step towards improving service delivery 
within the judiciary. It also serves as a final stop where citizens will be able to seek 
redress on sensitive national issues, including on disputed presidential elections. 
Land reforms 
136. The Ministry of Lands and stakeholders have developed the National Land Commission 
Bill and the Harmonised Draft Eviction and Resettlement Guidelines.50 The National 
Land Commission Bill is intended to provide for the establishment and development of 
institutional and administrative frameworks for the management of land in Kenya. If 
passed, the Bill will establish the National Land Commission to co-ordinate and oversee 
                                                
47 Gazette Notice No. 6653, 6654 and 6655. Dated 16 June 2011. See also 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/index.php?id=771 
48 Interview with an official of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)- Kenya Chapter- May 2011 
49 Supreme Court Act, 2011.  
50 Meeting of Reform Agenda Partners Roundtable held on 12-13 May 2011. See also the National Land 
Commission Bill, 2011  
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land reforms in Kenya. The Harmonized Draft Eviction and Resettlement Guidelines are 
intended to prevent undignified evictions and afford the country equitable resettlement 
policies.51   
 
137. There are concerns, however, that public involvement in the land reforms process has not 
been satisfactory. Some argue that the ministry is yet to fully open the process of 
developing the various laws to the public. There are also concerns that other ministries 
drafting legislation relevant to land issues are not consulting with the stakeholders and 
the Ministry of Lands. There are, therefore, several initiatives in different places that are 
not effectively coordinated -- ministries and government departments are not effectively 
coordinated in drafting legislation under the new constitution. 
Poverty, inequality and regional imbalances 
138. Chapter Eleven of the constitution establishes devolved governments. The Ministry of 
Local Government has established a Task Force on Devolved Government to advise on 
policy in this regard.52 The Task Force has consulted extensively and provided proposals 
on, among other things, the restructuring of the Provincial Administration, 
Operationalisation of the county governments and the financial management system of 
the counties. The report has also identified various legislative, policy and administrative 
frameworks that need to be put in place for the effective and efficient establishment of 
county governments.53 Three Bills on the implementation of devolved governments are 
currently undergoing stakeholder review. These include the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission Bill, 2011, the Vetting of Public Appointments by Parliament 
Bill, 2011, the Political Parties Bill, 2011 and the Elections Bill, 2011. If enacted, these 
Bills shall provide the institutional and legislative frameworks for county governments in 
Kenya.54 
 
139. Despite the above, various challenges can be anticipated in the establishment of county 
governments. Devolution of power and resources across the country will challenge the 
existing political and social structures. Resistance to the process of devolution is 
expected.55 Consequently, there will be confusion around the lines of authority and 
accountability; it is possible that in the initial phase, there will be resistance by 
entrenched groups at the centre as well as outright refusal to delegate administrative 
responsibilities because devolution will be undermine such interests. Devolution itself 
will test the commitment to reform on the part of the government.  
Youth unemployment 
140. Previous reports have outlined the various initiatives set up to tackle unemployment 
among the youth. These include the Kazi kwa Vijana (KKV) and the Youth Enterprise 
Development Fund. These initiatives have, however, had a limited impact in tackling 
youth unemployment in the country. KKV, in particular, remains untenable in the long 
term.56  Up to 28 per cent of survey respondents would like the government to 
build/revive industries in order to create more jobs for the youth. Up to 22 per cent of 
respondents feel that the government should allocate more funds to youth projects while 
14 per cent think that the government should give equal opportunity for jobs in each 
                                                
51 Ibid. See also http://www.lands.go.ke 
52 Interim Report of the Task Force on Devolved Government. A report on the Implementation of Devolved 
Government in Kenya, 20 April 2011.  
53 Ibid 
54 http://cickenya.org/bill_tracker 
55 Interview with a member of the Task Force on Devolved Government,  June 2011 
56 Interview with official from the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. See also The Standard, ‘Tuju calls for 
youth jobs to counter chaos’, Wednesday, 22 June 2011. 
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region.  
Figure 14: What can the government do to create more jobs for the youth? 
 
Electoral reforms  
141. The new constitution has overhauled the electoral system, providing for a new 
electoral body – the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). 
Parliament has passed the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act, 
which sets up the new electoral body. It has adopted report of the Interim 
Independent Boundaries Review Commission, which gave guidelines on how to 
delineate the new constituency boundaries. A new Commission, however, is not in 
place. Further, there is some lack of clarity on the date of the next general election: the 
constitution provides for elections to be held second Tuesday in August in every fifth 
year but there are those who argue that the term of the current parliament will end in 
December 2012. 
142. The Elections Bill (2011) has been drafted but awaits conclusion of the work of the 
national taskforce on devolution, so that the CIC can incorporate the proposals for 
County Governments in the Bill.57 The Bill provides for stiff penalties for electoral 
officials who subvert a free and fair election. It insulates the commission from political 
manipulation by specifying timeliness, for which Parliament is required to dispense 
with the final boundary report, failure to which the commission can by-pass it and 
forward its report for publication.  
143. Most Kenyans think using electronic voting and having a powerful independent body 
will ensure free and fair elections. Kenyans want a Commission that will enhance 
                                                
57
 “Elections Bill put on hold,” Daily Nation  14 June 2011 
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compliance with the law in order to have a clean election. They want improved 
security and a stop to voter bribery. 
Figure 15: What can be done to have free and fair elections? 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Use electronic voting system
Stop voter bribery
Have a powerful and independent electoral body
Enhance civic education before election
Enforce electoral laws
Improve security during elections
23%
15%
21%
11%
8%
12%
What can be done to have free and fair elections? 
 
144. Provision of civic education and voter education appears lacking. The next election will 
comprise several layers of elective posts but not many respondents are aware about these 
posts; many are able to identify only the post of the governor and senator. They are not 
aware, for example, about the women representatives. When asked which other seats 
apart from the President and MP they will be required to vote in the next general 
election, 29 per cent of the respondents were not aware of them. 41 per cent are not 
aware about the post senator and governor. Interestingly, close to 90 per cent are not 
aware about the post of women representative. .  Importantly,29 per cent were not aware 
of any. 
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Figure 16: Apart from the President and MP, what other seats do you know you will be 
required to vote for in the next elections? 
59%
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Apart from the President and M P, what other seats do you know you 
will be required to vote for in the next general elections? 
 
145. The passage of the IEBC Bill marks a new chapter in the management of elections in the 
country. It is hoped that when the new body is set up, political horse-trading and ethnic 
considerations will not take precedence over the national values. It is important for the 
IEBC to be unencumbered by any perceptions of bias. The trust of most Kenyans in 
having free and fair elections rests with the formation of a new powerful electoral body. 
National cohesion and unity  
146. The KNDR agreement required the Coalition Government to foster national unity and 
reconciliation through high level meetings in areas affected by the violence. Three years 
on, data shows that communities in those areas have undertaken peace initiatives with 
support from faith-based and community organisations and humanitarian organisations. 
These initiatives, such as ‘connector projects’ by the Catholic Church and the shelter 
reconstruction one, have contributed to rebuilding trust among communities.  
147. However, national level politics disrupt these efforts. Political statements and 
insinuations that reinforce ethnic division and mistrust undermine peace in regions that 
have previously experienced violence. Perceptions of discrimination or bias in the IDP 
resettlement programme and the fight against impunity through the International 
Criminal Court have undermined the progress made to reconcile communities. The 
continued presence of IDPs in camps, despite the nuances around this issue,58 is an 
indicator of the failure of reconciliation among communities.  
148. The government also established a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate past human rights abuses and recommend measures to guarantee that such 
violations do not recur in future. The TJRC is mandated to establish a record, among 
others, of all past historical human rights abuses, their cause, nature and extent as well 
                                                
58
 Concerns have been raised that the IDPs in camps are land-hungry individuals seeking to benefit from land 
allocation programmes rather than genuinely displaced persons unable to leave camps due to security reasons 
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as recommend prosecution for perpetrators of gross human rights violations. The TJRC 
Act required the commission to promote peace, justice, national unity, healing and 
reconciliation among the people of Kenya. 
149. Since its inception, however, the TJRC has suffered several challenges. As previously 
reported, civil society raised concern about the credibility of the commission’s 
chairperson . Public debate ensued and the Chief Justice was petitioned to set up a 
tribunal to investigate these allegations and rule on the suitability of the chair to head the 
TJRC. The chair stepped down in November 2010 after a tribunal was set up to 
investigate these allegations. However, Court cases challenging the mandate of  the 
tribunal have prevented the tribunal from working.59  
150. Nevertheless, the TJRC began its work, engaging 304 statement takers across the 
country, with 16 out of these being deployed to the prisons across the country where they 
conducted interviews, ultimately collecting close to 30,000 statements during the official 
window that closed in January 2011.60 In April 2011, it began public hearings in North 
Eastern Province where it concentrated on investigating the Wagalla massacre. Later, it 
held hearings in Western Province. The TJRC has asked for an extension of its mandate 
by six months after the expiry of its term in September 2011 to enable it reasonably 
complete its sittings and present its initial report. 
151. Despite these challenges, most respondents said they were confident that the TJRC will 
reveal the truth about past violations, promote peace and reconciliation among Kenyans 
and investigate past abuses of office by public officials. 
Figure 17: How confident are you that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission will 
...? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
Reveal the truth about past violations of human rights
Promote peace and reconciliation among Kenyans
Investigate past abuses of office by public officials
Provide justice for victims
Fullfil its mandate by end of the year
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How confident are you that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission will...?
Confident Not confident DK
 
152. However, the data shows that 32 per cent of the respondents are not confident the TJRC 
                                                
59 Pamela Chepkemei, ‘Kiplagat Gets Reprieve in Fight Against Tribunal’, The Star, 28 April 2011 
60 http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php/press-a-media/press-releases/244-qaa-press-conference-friday-13th-
may-2011 
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will fulfil its mandate by the end of the year. This could be due to several factors, main 
among them contestations over the suitability of its chairman, which delayed its work. 
Some vacant commission seats have not been filled, leaving the commission 
shorthanded. These and other factors have slowed the commission’s momentum and 
negatively impacted on its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
153. The commission’s term expires in September this year, well before it covers a siginificant 
portion of its work. Ultimately, the TJRC might have to forego some regions as well as 
thematic hearings touching on areas such as torture, massacres, land security and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). These are important regions for the the TJRC work. 
A report without insights from all areas of the country may not be received well by those 
from the regions where the TJRC did not cover.  
154. National unity and reconciliation can be achieved only through governance reforms, 
notably the fight against tribalism and corruption. The concerns expressed by local 
communities in the Rift Valley underline their perception that corruption and tribalism 
has permeated the reconstruction effort, hence the failure to achieve the desired 
outcomes. For instance, the perception among residents of Burnt Forest that IDPs have 
unduly benefitted from the shelter reconstruction programme has stirred deep 
resentment and eroded the gains made in promoting reconciliation.  
Transparency, accountability and impunity 
155. The KNDR required the government to promote transparency and accountability in 
public institutions and to fight impunity for corruption. Over the past three years, public 
satisfaction with the government’s achievement of these objectives has been, at best, 
average. This was informed by the perceived inability or unwillingness by the Kenya 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) to investigate high level corruption crimes. In this 
quarter, majority of respondents interviewed said the government had not made much 
progress in fighting corruption and tribalism: 
Figure 18: Has the country made progress in fighting tribalism/corruption? 
The fight 
against 
corruption
The fight 
against 
tribalism
49%
45%
51%
55%
Has the country made progress in ...?
No
Yes
 
156. Up to 49 per cent and 45 per cent of respondents think Kenya is making progress in the 
fight against tribalism and corruption, respectively. This reflects increasing confidence in 
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), which has summoned and questioned 
government officials over corruption allegations.61 However, 51 per cent of respondents 
think Kenya has not won the war on corruption mainly due to lack of human capacity to 
                                                
61 At least 22 such cases have been filed against state officials in 2011 
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deal with all reported cases, as KACC has only three offices across the country. In 
addition, lack of political support to investigate high profile criminal and civil suits is the 
biggest challenge to the fight against corruption. Indeed, majority of the respondents are 
of the view that politicians are responsible for the failure to fight against corruption: 
Figure 19: Who is responsible for the failure to fight against corruption? 
Judiciary
Kenya Anti Corruption Commission(KACC)
Politicians
The two Principals(Kibaki/Raila)
Don't know
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50%
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Conclusions 
157. The constitution provides a sound basis for a new Kenya. It anchors, firmly, all the 
Agenda 4 reforms. It comprises provisions that, if effectively implemented, will close the 
faults on which the post-2007 election violence was built. Unfortunately, its 
implementation has begun to show the patterns of behaviour reminiscent of the 
business-as-usual culture. Not everyone is recognising that the new constitution implies 
a break with the past.  
 
158. Political challenges continue to hinder comprehensive implementation of the 
constitution. This, coupled with inadequate civic education, has reduced public 
confidence in the implementation process. Intensifying civic education and building 
capacity for public vigilance is an important undertaking if implementation is to remain 
on track. 
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6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
159.  This report covers the period between April and June 2011. The discussion has focussed 
on the key themes under the KNDR agreement, the progress and challenges facing 
implementation of the new constitution. Several conclusions have already been made in 
several sections of the report. The aim of this section is to summarise the key findings 
and conclusions. 
 
160. The report has emphasised that the Agenda 4 reforms under the KNDR agreement were 
aimed at securing sustainable peace by addressing all the fault lines from which the post-
election violence evolved. The discussion has also noted that the new constitution 
anchors all the Agenda 4 reforms. The spirit of constitutionalism – based on values and 
principles espoused by the new constitution – is required to move the country forward. 
The new constitution is not an end in it itself; it is a means to achieving the goal of 
‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya’.  
161. The report has noted that the socio-political and economic situation did improve after 
the signing of the National Accord and has been getting better since then. By the end of 
2010, many survey respondents stated that life was better compared to 2008 and that 
they felt safer. By June 2010, however, people cited the increasing cost of living and 
inflation in general as the main challenges facing the country. Only half of the 
respondents feel safer and many are feeling that life is getting worse compared to what it 
was one year ago. The declining socio-economic situation requires urgent action because 
its negative social consequences could exacerbate political difficulties or even converge 
with other dynamics and destabilise the framework for reforms and the society in 
general. 
162. The ICC intervention in the Kenyan situation is causing political anxieties. It has 
occasioned formation and fragmentation of ethnic coalitions. In this sense, the ICC has 
become the driver for the 2012 succession politics and is increasingly becoming another 
fault line in Kenyan politics. Nonetheless, many Kenyans still believe that prosecution of 
perpetrators of violence will prevent a recurrence of violence. They are disillusioned by 
lack of progress in arresting lower and middle level perpetrators or holding senior and 
influential people to account. This lack of progress and absence of political will is now 
generating disillusionment. 
163. Another General Election is fast approaching even as progress in implementing 
institutional reforms in the police and the public service has been slow. Communities 
have not fully reconciled and IDPs are in camps. Political leaders are forming ‘ethnic 
coalitions’ rather than institutionalising political parties in readiness for the next 
election. Nonetheless, the new constitution also spells out the reform measures to be 
undertaken to improve the police. Change of attitude and behaviour, and adherence to 
modern democratic norms is an imperative for the police as the country moves towards 
another election. Thus, vetting of the police must be opened to the public in line with the 
standards set under the new constitution. This will improve public confidence in the 
police and begin creating a culture of transparency in the force. 
164. The promulgation of the constitution in August 2010 marked a new beginning for Kenya. 
The country had a tortuous and protracted two-decade struggle for comprehensive 
constitutional reforms. The new constitution is an important milestone in Kenya’s 
history. The lack of reforms and socio-political divisions that resulted from poor 
governance culminated in the post-2007 election violence. The new constitution clearly 
marks a new beginning and a transition from the older order to the new. There is 
progress in making some of the laws prioritised under Schedule 5 of the constitution. 
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However, there are many laws to finalised by 27 August 2011, the deadline imposed by 
the constitution. Parliament will have to increase pace to meet this deadline. Divisions in 
Parliament along party and other interests, however, will have to be resolved for it to 
effectively meet this challenge. 
165. There is progress in reforming the Judiciary. The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief 
Justice are in office through a public participation process. Nominees for other Judges of 
the Supreme Court were also recruited through a transparent process; a new standard 
entrenched by the constitution. There is also increased vigilance over recruitment 
processes for public offices. Public litigation efforts have increased in this respect. 
However, this new way of doing things is facing new challenges. The old order is fighting 
back.  
166. A conservative political culture and the old order threaten the implementation of the 
constitution. Lack of bi-partisan leadership, internal conflicts in the coalition and the 
Parliament are slowing the pace of constitution implementation. Further, civic education 
providers have not been active, yet awareness on the new constitution is critical for 
building citizens’ knowledge to create demand for reforms. However, the public is 
supportive of the new achievements, such as the public participation in the appointment 
of key state officers. 
167. The findings show that the constitution is one major achievement thus far. It is opening a 
new window for reforms and providing space for a fresh start. It has set new standards in 
the appointment of public officers. But there has been limited progress in some areas 
such as the police, national cohesion and reconciliation, and the fight against impunity in 
general. As the country approaches the next General Election, there is need to fast-track 
police reforms and the enactment of electoral laws in order to make adequate 
preparations for a clean and peaceful election. Importantly, the date for the next general 
election must be clarified soonest possible in order to prepare everyone and put the 
logistical measures in place early enough. 
 
